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Abstract
This paper estimates the Taylor rule under the statistical version, then the
dynamic version of the Central bank of Tunisia (CBT), using monthly data
from 1995 M1 to 2015 M12. The empirical results indicate that the CBT
follows the Taylor rule in its dynamic version.
1 Introduction
Taylor (1993)[27] was the first who proposed a simple rule to model the monetary
policy for the Federal Reserve Bank (FED) of the United States.
This rule provides a focal point for discussing the reaction functions and is in-
creasingly used as a very famous reference in monetary policy discussions, and
can be used to evaluate the subsequent monetary policy and to ensure the deter-
mination of future policy. It shows an increase in interest rates when inflation is
above its target level and a decline in a recession. In his study of US data, Tay-
lor (1993)[27] assumed that both inflation target rate and equilibrium real interest
rate are equal to 2%. Because the FED aimed the stability of inflation and eco-
nomic activity, he granted two coefficients equal to 0.5 for the gap of inflation
and output-gap. However, several theoretical1 and empirical studies concerned by
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1On the theoretical level, given a quadratic loss function of the central bank and linear curves
of demand and aggregate supply, in the dynamic structure of the economy, we can get the Taylor
rule by minimizing the loss function.
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the exploitation of optimality conditions of this rule for the conduct of monetary
policy.
Viewed its simplicity, several economists have criticized this rule because it can
not be optimal for all countries, especially since the economy is more complicated
and its structure varies across countries. In this context, McCallum (1993)[22],
noted that this type of rule according to current data has not been operational be-
cause of its needs to the information which do not currently available.
Svensson (2003)[26], showed that although the primary objective of monetary
policy is the stability of inflation and output, a simple Taylor-type rule will not be
optimal in a reasonable macroeconomic model.
In the years ninety, economists have criticized the Taylor rule on variable timings.
To solve this problem, the first reflections expressed the interest rate based on the
values delayed in inflation and output. It’s called "Backward-looking model." The
fundamental principle of this type of model is to implicitly assume that private sec-
tor expectations are adaptive. It results in retrospective rules "Backward-looking".
Many economists have criticized these types of rules. The most famous criticism
is of Lucas (1976)[20], he studied how agents form their expectations of the future
to influence their actual behavior. According to Lucas economists do not modify
their behavior basing on past policies and statics to describe the agents’ future
behavior.
In addition to the Lucas critique, when we following a Backward-looking ver-
sion rule, the instrument of monetary policy reacts only to shocks transmitted by
the inflation and output. However, in the presence of other types of shocks, this
rule does not lead to the price stability objective. Furthermore, a central bank
adopts a Backward-looking rule can achieve short-term goals but not the long-
term goals2.
Given the limitations of the Backward-looking rule, recent research, such as
Clarida, Gali et Gertler (1999)[6], Svensson (2003)[26] et Woodford (2004)[31],
argue that the models based on future expectations of economic indicators are bet-
ter than those that respond to the present or past variables. However, in practice
central banks tend to take the expected inflation as a target. Therefore, many re-
searchers as Gali and Gertler (1998)[13], Kozicki (1999)[18], Clarida, Gali, and
2the interest rate response to past changes in inflation will create more of the variability in the
level of inflation than desired
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Gertler (1998b)[5] and Mayes et al (2000)[21] have introduced inflation expecta-
tions and / or production to construct a Taylor rule forward-looking version.
In the late ninety, economists like Ball (1999)[2], Svensson (2000)[25] and Tay-
lor (1999b)[28] have criticized the Taylor rule on the point of missing other key
variables such as the exchange rate, which is an important variable in an open
economy.
The objective of this work is to determine the nature of the rule that reflect bet-
ter the behavior of central bank of Tunisia.The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 reviews the previous literature studies. Section 3 describes the
data used in this paper. Section 4 introduces the basic methodology. Section 5
discusses the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature review
After Taylor (1993)[27], many economists estimated Taylor rule and its exten-
sions. Indeed, McCallum (2000)[23] used historical analysis to estimate Taylor
rule by using economic data of U.S and U.K for the period from 1962 to 1999, and
Japan from 1972 to 1998. He suggested that rules messages are more dependent
upon which instrument rather than which target variable is used.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998a)[4] evaluated and tested the forward-looking
monetary policy to study the behavior of central banks in the United States, Japon
and some European countries. They used the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM). The result showed that the Central banks in these countries followed the
Taylor rule in their interest setting behavior 3.
Following Clarida et al (1998b)[5] , Ghadha, Sarno and Valente (2004)[3]
studied empirically whether asset prices and exchange rates may be included in
a standard interest rate rule by using the data for United States, United Kingdom
and Japan since 1979. The result showed that asset prices and exchange rates can
be used as information variables for a standard Taylor rule.
Gorter, Jacobs and De Haan (2008)[16] estimated Taylor rules by using Con-
sensus Economics data for expected inflation and output growth, for Euro area,
3see for example Clarida et al (1999)[6], Gerlach and Schnabel (2000)[15], Orphanides
(2001)[24], Gerdesmeier and Roffia (2003)[14], Huston and Spencer(2005)[17], Taylor and
Darvradakis (2006)[30]
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they found that ECB takes expected inflation and output into account in the set-
ting interest rates. They showed that the indications of accommodating behavior
by the ECB implied by contemporaneous Taylor rules seem to be mainly driven
by the lack of a forward-looking perspective.
Some empirical studies focused on emerging countries, have estimated mone-
tary policy rules of central banks in these countries.
In fact, Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2007)[8], estimated forward-looking mon-
etary policy rules for Israel and Turkey, the results showed that forward-looking
Taylor rules seem to provide a reasonable description of central bank behavior
in both countries. Aklan and Nargelecekenler (2008)[1] estimated the backward-
looking and forward-looking monetary policy reaction functions of the central
bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT). They suggest that CBRT followed the
Taylor rule in its interest setting behavior. The response coefficient of inflation
and output gap is greater in the forward-looking model than in the backward-
looking model.
De Carvalho (2012)[7], estimated Taylor rules by using the Consensus Eco-
nomic Forecasts database for four largest Latin American economies, he used the
GMM and real-time data of the output gap in Brazil and Mexico. He found that
interest rate market forecasts can be explained by Taylor rules only for Mexico.
3 Data
In this study, we use monthly data from 1995 M1 to 2015 M12. To evaluate
which Taylor type rules enunciates the Central Bank of Tunisia’s behavior, we
use four variables which are: The money market rate was used as a proxy for the
nominal interest rate, the index of consumer prices (CPI) was used to measure
the inflation rate, pit which is then computed as: pit = 100 ∗ ln( CPIt
CPIt−12
).
the industrial production index (IPI) was used to measure the output gap.
That defined as the percentage deviation of actual output from its potential trend.
The expression of this variable is given by:
outputgap = 100 ∗ (ipi− ipipotentiel/ipipotentiel). We use the HP filter
to estimate the potential output with a coefficient (λ = 14400) because the data
are monthly and the effective real exchange rate. The data are available in the
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database of the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT) and the International Financial
Statistic (IFS).
Figure 1: Annual variability of variables between 1995-2015
4 Methodology
Taylor (1993)[27] suggests a very specific and simple reaction function of mone-
tary policy that can be described by the contemporary inflation and the output gap
given by:
it
∗ = r¯ + pit∗ + α(pit − pit∗) + βyt (1)
With: i∗t the nominal interest rate, pit the inflation rate, pi
∗
t the inflation target rate,r¯
the long-term real interest rate,α the amount by which the central bank raises the
real interest rate in ex-post response to a rise in inflation to its target level, yt the
output gap in period t, β amount by which the central bank raises the real interest
rate in response to an increase in real output above its potential level.
In practice, central banks aim to smooth the interest rate. However, the reac-
tion function is then described in terms of interest rates partial adjustment4.The
interest rate smoothing can be introduced into the model by means of the partial
adjustment mechanism 5 as follows:
it = (1− ρ)i∗t + ρit−1 + vt (2)
4Several researchers like McCallum (2000)[23] Levin et al (1999)[19] argue that a Taylor type
rule with an interest rate smoothing is relatively robust.
5 See Clarida et al (1998b)[5].
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The smoothing parameter ρ[0.1] ,with this partial adjustment the central bank
adjusts on each period its instrument to remove only a fraction (1− ρ) of the gap
between the current target level and some linear combination of its past values.
Following Taylor (1993)[27], Clarida et al (1998a, 1998b, and 1999 )[6, 5, 6]
and Aklan and Nargelecekenler (2008)[1], we specify the reaction function of the
central bank where i∗t is the short term nominal interest rate target of the central
bank as follows:
it
∗ = r¯ + pi∗t+n + α[E(
pit+n
Ωt
)− pi∗t+n] + βE(
yt − y∗t
Ωt
) (3)
Where r¯ is the real interest rate of long-term equilibrium, pit+n the inflation rate
between the period t and t+n, pi∗t+n the inflation target for the period formed at the
period t, α and β are the parameters that describe the response of the policy rate to
deviations of inflation and output respectively from their targets. E() expectation
operator, Ωt the information provided for the period t. if the equations 2 and 3 are
combined, the result is as follows:
it = (1− ρ){r¯ + pi∗t+n + α[E(
pit+n
Ωt
)− pi∗t+n]} (4)
If the expression of the mathematical expectation is excluded, the result is as fol-
lows:
it = (1− ρ)φ+ (1− ρ)αpit+n + (1− ρ)βxt+ ρit−1 + µt (5)
Where: φ = r¯ + pi∗t+n, xt = yt − y∗t , µt = (1 − ρ){x(pit+n − E[pit+nΩt ] + νt)}, µt
is an error term which is not correlated with information at the instant t. In the
existing literature, equation(5) was estimated by the GMM.In order to determine
which specifications represents better the policy followed by the Central Bank of
Tunisia. This study want to estimate the Taylor rule in the statistical and dynamic
version.
5 Results and Interpretation
We begin this empirical work by evaluating the Taylor rule in the traditional ver-
sion. Then we estimate the Taylor type rule.
X Traditional Taylor rule (TTR) estimation
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Table 1: estimation table
Traditional rule Static rule Dynamic rule Forward-looking rule Exchange rate
cst - 6.324*** 0.007 0.176* -0.101
- (0.000) (0.915) (0.098) (0.322)
ρ - - 0.982*** 0.974*** 0.989***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
pi -0.010 -0.010 0.018** -0.013 0.003**
(0.733) (0.737) (0.028) (0.166) (0.010)
Gap 0.001 0.001 -0.011 -0.015 -0.012
(0.426) (0.423) (0.413) (0.297) (0.374)
REER - - - - -0.010
(0.133)
R¯2 0.986 0.987 0.983 0.982 0.983
DW 1.721 1.718 1.736 1.677 1.753
* Indicate the significance level at 10%.
*** Indicate the significance level at 5%.
**** Indicate the significance level at 1%.
The aim is to determine whether the traditional Taylor rule translates the behavior
of the monetary policy of the Central Bank of Tunisia.
Equation (1) is a linear rule, econometrically, this kind of rules is estimable by
ordinary Least Squares method (OLS). However, the estimation results by such
method leads to the presence of an autocorrelation error. In fact, The Durbin Wat-
son statistic is equal 0.04 and we have 252 observation, it is not into the interval
[d2, 4 − d2] which means an autocorrelation problem of order 1. For this raisin,
we used the AR1 regression to estimate the TTR.
The estimation results presented in table 1, show that the coefficients of infla-
tion and output gap are not statically insignificant. This implies that the TTR does
not express the central bank of Tunisia’s behavior.
X Estimation of Taylor Type Reaction Function
In the last section, we showed that the TTR could not explain the behavior of
the Central Bank of Tunisia. Consequently, in this section we try to estimate two
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reaction functions, which are the static reaction function that does not include a
smoothing interest rate, then the dynamic version which will include it.
X Estimation of the static reaction function
To estimate the static rule, we inspire from the idea of Gerdesmier and Roffia
(2003)[14] applied to the euro area case. Which consist to rewrite the equation (1)
as follows:
it = α + αpipit + αy(yt − y¨t) + ξt (6)
with
α : is a constant,
αpi = (1 + α): the actual inflation rate coefficient,
αy: the output gap coefficient.
Because of the autocorrelation problem, we use the AR(1) regression. The result
indicate that the coefficients αpi and αy are statistically insignificant. Accordingly,
the static rule does not reflect the BCT’s behavior.
X Estimation of the dynamic response function
In this section our aim is to determine whether the central bank of Tunisia adopts
a partial adjustment of its interest rate.
The smoothing interest rate is an adjustment of the Taylor rule; that was adopted
by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999)[6]. To estimate this reaction function we
follow the methodology of Gerdesmeirend and Roffia (2003)[14] for the euro area
and Huang. The function is written as follows:
it = a0 + ρit−1 + αpipit + αyyg + µt (7)
with: α0 = [(r∗ + pi)− αpipi∗], αpi = (1− ρ)α et αy = (1− ρ)β.
ρ:Partial adjustment coefficient of the interest rate 0 < ρ < 1
It is a dynamic model, therefore we use the Generalized Method of Moment
(GMM)6to estimate equation (7), The ADF test shows that all variables are sta-
tionary.
The application of GMM method requires the choice of instruments. In most
cases, the choice of instrumental variables is determined by the economic litera-
ture. It is to select the delays of the explanatory variables to determine the vector
6The GMM requires that all variables should be stationary.
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of instruments, without using too many instruments or too late to avoid the risk
of over-identification. Gerdesmeir and Roffia (2003)[14] estimate the different
specifications to determine the optimal Taylor rule which represents the behavior
of the monetary authorities in the Euro area. They use GMM method, instruments
are delays of one to six explanatory variables. Ftiti (2011)[12] uses four delays to
estimate the optimal rule for New Zealand. Other studies with the same purpose,
use delays from one to four of the independent variables. Thus, in the study we
choose the delays from one to four as instruments.The results are shown in Ta-
ble.1.
The econometric result show that the inflation rate coefficient is statically signif-
icant and positive (0.018), the coefficient of the output gap (-0.011) is statically
insignificant, and the partial adjustment interest rate coefficient that is equal to
0.982 is significant and high. It is clear that the BCT objective focus on the infla-
tion situation. The high level of smoothing parameter imply that the CBT makes
significant effort on smoothing interest rates, which has often been interpreted like
a sign of a great ‘preference of gradualism’of the central banks.7
The adjustment coefficient (R¯2 = 0.983) which measures the variation degree of
the short-run interest rate, is high, so the estimation rule has a great explanatory.
The estimation results show that this estimation is better and more realistic
than the one of the static model. This can be explained by the inclusion of the
interest rate logs as an explanatory variable.
X Estimation of the Forward-looking Taylor rule
By introducing of the inflation expectations, our approach consider that the active
period of monetary policy is one year, so we assume that the BCT reacts to(pit+1).
We can rewrite equation (7) as follows:
it = c+ ρit−1 + Φpi(pit+1 − pi∗) + Φy(yt − y¨t) + ξt (8)
Ago the Lucas critique (1976), different statistical methods appeared to estimate
the structural parameters describing the rules of economic policy. Using the or-
thogonality conditions related to the Euler equations, the GMM allows to estimate
but also to test these models with rational expectations. (Patrick Fève, François
Langot (1995)[9]. The GMM estimation result of equation (8) show that the co-
efficients of the inflation rate and the output gap are statistically insignificant.
Hence, such rule can’t expressed the CBT comportment. At this point of our
analysis, the best model that reflects the CBT’s behavior is the dynamic model.
7See Fourçan and Vranceanu ( 2007)[10] and Licheron (2009)[11]
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X The exchange rates effect on a Taylor type rule
several researchers have criticized the Taylor rule on the failure of other key vari-
ables such as the exchange rate which is an important variable in an open econ-
omy. Thus, the purpose of this section consist to determine whether the monetary
policy instrument has respond on the exchange rate fluctuation. In this framework,
the exchange rate has two effects which are the direct and indirect ones.
the first one signify that the monetary policy instrument responds to the do-
mestic indicators such as inflation and output gap in addition to the exchange rate
fluctuations, and the second one means that the monetary policies do not directly
react to the exchange rate fluctuations.
Taylor(2000)[29], ’concludes that the monetary policies, which directly react to
the exchange rate fluctuation, do not reach a good inflation and economic sta-
bilization. The most important finding in his study is the existence of indirect
exchange rate channel, which affects the monetary policy in the absence of a di-
rect channel’. Thus, in this part we added the exchange rate fluctuation variable
to equation(7). The estimation of this new equation can determine weather the
monetary policy of CBT respond directly or indirectly to the exchange rate fluc-
tuations. We rewrite the equation(7) as follows:
it = a0 + ρit−1 + αpipit + αyyg + αγ∆et + µt (9)
Where:
αpi = (1− ρ)α, αy = (1− ρ)β, αγ = (1− ρ)γ.
To estimate this equation, we apply the GMM, the estimated results show that
the exchange rate fluctuations coefficient is negative and statically insignificant.
Our results indicate that the CBT does not reply explicitly to the exchange rate
fluctuations.
6 conclusion
Taylor(1993)[27] is the first who has made a rule of monetary policy expressed
in terms of short-term interest rates. Several researchers have criticized this rule
on many points. On the basis of these criticisms different rules resulted from the
latter called ’Taylor type rule’ .
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Within this work, we want to determine the best rule that reflects the CBT’s
behavior. Indeed, using monthly data from 1995 M1 to 2015 M12, the results
show that the Taylor rule in the dynamic version in its interest setting behavior
can explain the monetary policy rule of CBT. Then we add the exchange rate fluc-
tuations to this rule, the results show that the monetary policy rule of the CBT
react indirectly to the exchange rate fluctuations.
Our finding confirm that the most important aim of the Tunisian monetary pol-
icy consist to stabilize the general price level in order to catch-up growth.
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